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APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS 
Appellee has advanced three arguments in support of 
its position that the determination of the Utah State Tax 
Commission should be upheld. These are: 
1. Slag, consisting of materials that have already 
once been severed from land, is by its very 
nature personalty; 
2. Rocky Mountain Energy conveyed, at the most, a 
mere license to L.A. Young, and a license is not 
an interest in real property; and 
3. Although the payment made was by state warrant, 
that was merely fortuitous, and, thus, Rule 425 
is not controlling. 
Rocky Mountain Energy Company will address these seriatim. 
RESPONSIVE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE SLAG PILE IN QUESTION WAS REALTY IN 
THE HANDS OF KENNECOTT COPPER AND ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN ENERGY 
For the first time in this matter, Appellee has raised 
in its responsive brief the argument that because the slag 
consists of materials once previously severed from realty, it is 
by its very nature personal property and its sale is, thus, 
subject to tax. There are several faults with that position. 
This argument was never advanced by the Audit Division before 
the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission did not rest its 
decision on this ground; in fact, the Tax Commission never 
considered this issue. Rather, its analysis was with respect to 
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the transaction between Rocky Mountain Energy and L.A. Young, 
not the inherent nature of slag. 
If, in fact, Respondent's position was accurate, a 
taxable sale would have occurred when the material was leased 
from Kennecott Copper to Rocky Mountain Energy. Thus, if 
Respondent seriously advances this position, they should look to 
Kennecott Copper for payment of a sales tax. 
The slag in question covers 175 acres, is generally 
flat on top and is approximately 100 feet deep. (Stipulated 
Fact number 3.) It is not used in the Kennecott Copper 
operation. Moreover, Rocky Mountain Energy has an exclusive 
right to remove the slag for a 10 year period, renewable for an 
additional 5 year period, under a payment of a minimum royalty 
of $200,000. Rocky Mountain Energy has the right to install a 
plant if it wishes to process the slag. The slag is truly a 
mountain, not a mole hill. 
As pointed out in the Affidavit of Professor Martinez 
(Record at pp. 127-131), the issue of whether slag is treated as 
realty or personalty depends on the totality of the 
circumstances. In the reported cases, slag is typically held to 
be realty. See, e.g., St. Louis Smelting Ref. Co. v. Hoban, 209 
S.W.2d 119 (1948); Havsville Alaska Juneau Forest Indus., Inc. 
748 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1988); State v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 
Rptr. 363 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Smith v. El Paso Gold Mines, 
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Inc., 720 P.2d 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); but see. United States 
Steel Corp. v. Board of Assessment, 223 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1966). 
It is respectfully submitted that the size of the slag 
pile in question here, the fact that it is leased for a minimum 
of 10 years by Kennecott Copper and the nature of the operations 
thereon indicate that the 175 acres property is realty, not 
personalty. 
For the foregoing reasons, Rocky Mountain Energy 
Company respectfully submits that the newly advanced argument by 
Respondent that the slag is inherently personalty should be 
rejected by this Court in these circumstances. 
II. THE INTEREST OF L.A. YOUNG & COMPANY IS AN 
INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
Appellee argues that L.A. Young & Company had a "mere 
license" and that fact is dispositive of the case. Their 
further argument is that a license cannot be an "interest" in 
real property, but is something less, and, therefore, the slag 
must be treated as salable personalty. 
It is undisputed that L.A. Young & Company was given 
the right to come upon the property in question to conduct 
extraction operations, and, upon a payment of a royalty per ton, 
to remove the extracted slag for use in highway construction. 
As was argued in its opening brief, Rocky Mountain Energy 
respectfully submits that attempting to affix a label to this 
interest is not the most useful exercise. The statute in 
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question sets out a clear distinction between property severed 
from land and that which is not. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-
102(13)(a)(iv) & (b)(i). Clearly, Rocky Mountain Energy did not 
sell slag that had been severed and processed. Had it done sof 
then there would have been a sale of personalty as the Appellee 
contends. However, the interests of L.A. Young & Company would 
have been completely different. It would have had no interest 
in the real property in place. Rather, it would simply be 
buying a product made after severance. That product would 
clearly be personalty. It is nothing more than a correlative to 
buying either gravel from a gravel pit by the truck load or by 
leasing or otherwise purchasing the right to occupy land and 
mine gravel therefrom. The two are totally different and, more 
importantly, give rise to completely different implications 
under the sales tax laws of the state of Utah. 
The Appellee places great reliance on the case of 
Radke v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 334 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1959), and, 
particularly, the statement therein that "[i]n general, a 
contract simply giving a right to take ore from a mine, no 
interest or estate being granted, confers a mere license." Id. 
at 1086. (Brief of Respondent at p. 8.) 
An examination of the Radke case is informative. At 
issue in that case is whether landowners in Logan County, 
Colorado could clear title to their property by extinguishing 
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mineral reservations in grants by the Union Pacific Railroad to 
prior landholders. Those prior grants involved the sale by 
Union Pacific Railroad of some of the land grant land owned in 
Colorado. 
A determination that the reservations in the deeds 
created more than a license under Colorado law would have meant 
that the titles would continue to be clouded. The United States 
Supreme Court has previously examined the same language in a 
granting clause and held that the grantor retained an interest 
in real property. The Colorado Supreme Court chose to conclude 
differently, based upon an initial determination that it had,the 
right under Colorado law to reach its own conclusion as to the 
proper construction of the reservation in the deed 
notwithstanding prior United States Supreme Court holdings. 
In its analysis, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that 
the interest retained was merely one "to prospect" and "if 
found" to extract ore. Those interests are held to be inchoate 
with no present reservation of an interest in land. 364 P.2d at 
1083. It was obvious that the Colorado Supreme Court felt it 
unfair that landholders in 1958 should hold clouded titles 
because, in deeds given to prior grantees in the 1890's and 
early 1900's, the Union Pacific had reserved such rights and 
during the interim had done nothing to either prospect or 
benefit from these rights. By holding that they were "mere 
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licenses" undei Colorado law 1 he rights became revocable and 
were extinguished by the subsequent sale of the land by the 
Union Pacific grantees. 
Nonei helesfi, the court struggled with its prior 
decisions acknowledged that a license could have two 
meanings, a profit-a-prendrf try easement. 
As n\»t <.v1 in the dissent, \ ne opinion cr - Colorado 
Supreme Court in this case was -it *or ^ith most * - : , -r 
ruling. Id. at 1089-90 ijjuv/i and circumstances and 
the s i yi'i f i«',;arice ot the result U; - ••.-> ...)qa.- County landholders, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the ied as 
it was in that cas^, howm e? 11" * ^-:ie iai/-s ino circumstances 
c --ist in this i.ase, Moreover, Radke was decided under 
Colorado law and provides 'it* , ss i stance as l;,o whether 
L.A. Young' . . * * s rin "interest" in real 
property * purposes JI trie i:tcrt -• <-- ;ax Act. 
There - nothing s rase. We are not 
deal - tnequit^; Moreover, .<e are not dealing with 
*™ uncertaii specula! i •- "inchoate" situation. A t J ansaction 
was made aivmo ft Young :
 f qht ^ immediately 
come extract slaq :t di<i - immediately, 
paying : oyalty - Mountain Energy f--r thp slag 
extracted - Respondent • opening brief 
iterest i-i , iv jenerally considered a 
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profit-a-prendre and is an "interest" in real property for most 
purposes• 
Most significantly, it is submitted that the Utah 
Sales Tax Act clearly distinguishes between the sale of property 
severed from realty which is personalty and subject to sales tax 
and that which has not been severed. That distinction is 
controlling. The issue before this Court is whether the rights 
conveyed to L.A. Young constitute an "interest" in real property 
for purposes of the Utah Sales Tax Actf not the label to be 
given to that interest. Because a right to mine unsevered ore 
was granted, no sales tax should attach. 
III. THE PAYMENT BY A STATE WARRANT EXEMPTS THE 
TRANSACTION IN QUESTION. WHETHER FORTUITOUS 
OR NOT 
Appellee's final argument is that even though the 
transaction in question falls within the literal language of 
Rule 865-19-42S, that regulation of the Tax Commission does not 
apply. The regulation states as follows: 
"If the sale is paid for by a warrant 
drawn upon the state treasurer or the 
official disbursing agent of any political 
subdivision, the sale is considered as 
being made to the state of Utah or its 
political subdivision as exempt from tax." 
Utah Admin. Code R. 865-19-42S. 
Appellee argues that the language is not controlling. 
Clearly, the thrust of their argument is that payment by a state 
warrant was merely fortuitous. That is, Rocky Mountain Energy 
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reques ted payment directly 1 roni the state by a state warrant as 
co-payee, not for tax planning purposes, but because of the 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t a b i l i t y of L.A. young Construct i .MI ujinpariiy , Evon 
conceded, arguendo, Appellee's position must 
fail. The transaction was structured so that payment was made 
by state warrant. The product .in quest inn was placed in a state 
highway ^ the contractor, Whether Rocky Mountain Energy was 
cognizant f ? o> implications and devised this transaction 
£f • s ill wlictliif'i i l. ib simply - benefit of a 
fortuitous incident of the transaction, is ot no moment It 
cannot be the ] aw that one who knowingly devises a transacts on 
il in obtain tax benefits is entitled to the benefits conferred 
thereby, but one who unwittingly creates an identical 
transaction Is not- As is the case in man -\ - - t 
ol the transaction ha* a great deal to do with its taxation. 
Here, the form fell squarely within Rule 865-19-42S, and Rocky 
Mountain Energy is entitled I * the benefits conferred thereby. 
IV. NO PENALTY SHOULD APPLY TO ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
ENERGY COMPANY 
As is unfortunately common in these matters, a penalty 
was levied against Rocky Mountain Energy, The Tax Commission, 
,i n i 1: H ele< • I h i on , iiiacJe nu 1 inci i ny t: ha t: woul d support the 
imposition of a penalty, nor could it have. For that reason, 
the imposition of a penalty should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated and upon the authority cited, 
Rocky Mountain Energy respectfully submits that this Court 
should reverse the decision of the tax court and remand the case 
to the Tax Commission for a refund of the amount paid, including 
interest and penalties. 
DATED this /f day of January, 1992. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By 
Robert A. Peterson 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and 
correct copies of the within and foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this /'7 day of 
January, 1992, to the following: 
Brian L. Tarbet 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
/u Jf ^ r-
gi\vpl\036\000018rg.w51 
-9-
